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Abstract
We argue that investor protection changes the relative importance of productivity
and scale as drivers of corporate control transfers. Using a large sample of European
firms we find that control transfers are more correlated with increasing profitability and
less correlated with increasing size when investor protection is strong. This suggests
that improving productivity is more important as a driver of acquisitions when investor
protection is strong, and alleviating financial constraints or empire building are more
important when investor protection is weak. Our evidence is consistent with the idea
that good investor protection promotes a more productive use of corporate assets.
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Legal investor protection is a key determinant of the development of financial markets
(see, among others, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Djankov,
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). Markets with better investor protection
allocate more capital to firms with good investment opportunities (see Mclean, Zhang, and
Zhao (2012), and Wurgler (2000)), and invest more in R&D and innovation (Brown, Mar-
tinsson, and Petersen 2013). Part of this improvement in the allocation of resources can be
attributed to the market for control. For instance, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that better
investor protection increases the frequency of mergers and acquisitions. Transfers of control
—through the purchase and sale of controlling equity stakes— can render important gains in
scale and productivity. Yet, how exactly these gains arise and what is the precise role for
investor protection is still a matter of ongoing research (see, for example, Burkart, Gromb,
Mueller, and Panunzi (2014)).
In this paper we empirically study the impact of investor protection on control transfers.
This is a challenging task in the international context that is required to have cross-country
variation in investor protection. Control transfers in public firms are relatively infrequent,
and among private firms, where control transfers are more frequent, data are seldom available.
In order to overcome these obstacles we study a unique sample of private firms in Europe
that have experienced transfers of control. Our sample results from the combination of
two datasets: Zephyr, which identifies deals such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and
Amadeus, which gives access to financial data on European private firms. Our sample is
close to the one in Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015), who study the impact of acquisitions
on financial constraints, although they do not examine the role of investor protection. We
provide direct micro-level evidence on the relationship between control transfers and real
outcomes such as firm size and profitability, and how this interplay is aﬀected by investor
protection.
Productivity and scale are two drivers of control transfers in corporations. The produc-
tivity channel refers to acquisitions where control is transferred to a shareholder that can run
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the firm more eﬃciently, even if the firm remains at the same scale, because the shareholder
has access to better technology or better managerial practices. The scale channel refers
to two sub-cases. On the one hand, by relaxing financial constraints the new controlling
shareholder can solve an underinvestment problem at the target firm. On the other hand,
control transfers can be related to overinvestment when acquisitions are motivated by empire
building (Jensen 1986).
The model in Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014) shows that stronger investor
protection positively aﬀects the productivity channel. Better investor protection makes it
more likely that control is transferred to more productive owners. Therefore, our empirical
setting can be understood as a test for their theoretical prediction. We add the consideration
of firm scale, which is absent from their model because scale is exogenously fixed. We are
motivated to do so because the results in Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) suggest that
financial constraints are crucial in transfers of control, and hence that the scale channel is a
first-order concern.
We argue that investor protection has diﬀerent eﬀects on these two drivers of control
transfers. When investor protection is strong, under and overinvestment problems are less
severe. Hence, scale becomes less important as a motive for control transfers. In a market
with perfect investor protection (i.e., without financial frictions), increasing productivity is
the only valid reason behind a transfer of control. Therefore, control transfers should be
more correlated with productivity improvements in high investor-protection markets. In low
investor-protection markets control transfers should be more correlated with increasing firm
size, for good or bad reasons. In those markets financial constraints are more binding for
target firms aﬀected by underinvestment. At the same time, empire-building acquirers face
fewer constraints in low protection markets. Both reasons suggest increasing firm scale as a
result of control transfers.
Empirically we compare each firm in the data before and after the transfer of control. This
feature of our data is quite unique since it is often hard to observe firms after the transfer
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of control (i.e., post-transfer data for acquired firms is hard to get). In regression terms,
we rely on within-firm time-series variation by using firm-level fixed eﬀects, which alleviate
concerns about many unobservables. Our measure of investor protection to compare across
markets is the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2008). We find that profitability (return on assets, ROA) improvements are more likely
and stronger in magnitude after transfers of control when investor protection is high. This
finding is consistent with the prediction of Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014).
At the same time, and also when investor protection is high, we find that increasing firm
size (total book assets) is less likely and weaker in magnitude after transfers of control. This
suggests that scale is less relevant as a motive for transferring control in countries with high
investor protection.
Can we really attach these results to investor protection? We perform a horse race
between investor protection and other country characteristics to see where the diﬀerential
eﬀect on control transfers is coming from. Alternative explanations have to account for the
simultaneous eﬀects on profitability and firm size that we find, which is not obvious. For
example, we do not find that per capita GDP or accounting standards (for example, the
adoption of IFRS) absorb the eﬀect of investor protection. Typical governance indicators
such as the rule of law, the eﬀectiveness of the government, or regulation do not explain our
results either. At the same time, it is hard to empirically diﬀerentiate investor protection from
unobserved characteristics that vary simultaneously along country and time (i.e., country-
year fixed eﬀects). Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with our predictions, but
we cannot rule out all other explanations.
We perform auxiliary tests that complement our previous results. First, we decompose
the eﬀects of control transfers on profitability, scale, and capital structure. We find that
profitability increases are achieved mostly through cost-cutting rather than increasing sales.
In this sense, our results are in line with the literature on the relationship between acquisitions
and productivity (see Li (2013), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) among others). In
4
terms of scale, the negative diﬀerential eﬀect of investor protection in control transfers is
seen both in tangible assets and working capital, but the results are stronger for tangible
assets. The negative eﬀect of investor protection is also seen in leverage, which points towards
the stronger alleviation of financial constraints in poor protection countries. Second, we find
that the relative size of the acquirer and the target interacts with investor protection in
the expected way. Large acquirers are more likely to relax financial constraints (Hadlock
and Pierce 2010), and hence to increase target size, but this eﬀect is moderated by investor
protection for the same reason as before, namely that everyone is less financially constrained
when investor protection is high. Finally, we find that our results are robust to focusing
on serial acquirers as Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), which allows us to control
for acquirer fixed eﬀects, and to diﬀerent subsamples according to the type of acquisition
(diversifying or not) and the ownership structure of targets and acquirers (e.g., comparing
listed and non-listed acquirers).
The paper that is closest to ours from a theoretical standpoint is Burkart, Gromb, Mueller,
and Panunzi (2014), who study the relation between investor protection and takeovers in
a variety of contexts. Our empirical setup of small firms is similar to their analysis of a
takeover with a pivotal large shareholder, which avoids the classic problem of free-riding in
dispersed ownership structures (Grossman and Hart 1980). In this case investor protection
is enough to increase the eﬃciency of the takeover market. A contribution relative to their
setup is that we also consider financial frictions at the firm level.1 In their model, financial
constraints aﬀect potential bidders at the moment of paying for the target, but the target
itself is not aﬀected by frictions in the investment process. Frictions at the firm level can
aﬀect target value endogenously by changing the scale of the firm.
On the empirical side, and since the seminal work of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
1In a sense our paper follows the theoretical literature that studies the relationship between the allocation
of control and pledgeable income (see Tirole (2006), chapter 10). A unifying theme in this literature is that
diﬀerent allocations of control can increase the funding capacity of a firm. Other papers study the eﬀect of
investor protection on the allocation of control from particular angles, for example, for succession decisions in
family firms (see Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003), and Caselli and Gennaioli (2013)), or the organization
of pyramidal business groups (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006).
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and Vishny (1998), many papers have studied the impact of legal investor protection on
financial markets. For example, the depth of stock markets, firm valuation, and the level
of ownership concentration are all related to investor protection (see La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), and Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2008) among others). Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) provide a unifying model that accounts
for many of these features, but it does not include the market for control. Probably because
of data limitations, the market for control is less studied in empirical work. There are a
few exceptions, although none of these papers studies the predictions that we study. Rossi
and Volpin (2004) study the frequency of mergers and acquisitions as a function of investor
protection. Foley and Greenwood (2010) study the evolution of the ownership structure of
firms after the IPO as a function of investor protection in the country. Finally, Bris and
Cabolis (2008) study the gains from "importing" good investor protection through cross-
border mergers. Along these lines we study the relative importance of the investor protection
of the country of the target and of the acquirer. We find that the investor protection of the
country of the target explains most of our results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 develops the main testable predic-
tions. Section 2 shows the empirical evidence with the sample of European firms. Section 3
concludes.
1 Hypotheses Development
We are empirically interested in how investor protection aﬀects the outcomes of control
transfers, in particular firm productivity and scale. As a starting point we consider the
sales of controlling blocks described in Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014). In
their model a firm with a controlling shareholder faces a single potential acquirer. Transfers
of control may not go through if the acquirer is financially constrained, even if she is a
more productive user of the assets. Better investor protection eases the acquirer’s financial
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constraints and makes transfers more likely. Hence, our first prediction follows directly from
Corollary 2 in Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014):
Empirical Prediction 1 (Transfers of Control and Productivity): Transfers of
control are more correlated with improvements in productivity in high investor-protection
markets than in low investor-protection markets.
In Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014)’s setup investor protection leads to a
more eﬃcient market of control, although firm scale is constant. In their model financial
constraints aﬀect the ability of acquirers to bid aggressively for a firm, but not the firm
itself when it needs to invest. However, recent evidence suggests that acquisitions are also
related to lifting financial constraints at the firm level so firms do not forgo valuable invest-
ment opportunities. Acquirers can often increase target size because of both their internally
generated cash flow or their ability to raise funds from capital markets (Erel, Jang, and
Weisbach 2015).
In a general setting we can decompose total firm value in two components: productiv-
ity times total capital invested (scale). Acquirers can increase firm value if they are more
productive users of the same capital. For example, if they bring better technology or better
managerial practices. At the same time, and not mutually exclusive with being more pro-
ductive, acquirers can aﬀect firm value by modifying the scale of the operation. According
to Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) scale has received less attention than productivity in
the M&A literature. If the firm is initially constrained and investing at a second-best level,
then relaxing financial constraints and increasing scale can create value. Almeida, Campello,
and Hackbarth (2011) present a formal model along these lines, where a distressed firm is
acquired by another firm with financial slack. Even if there are no operational synergies be-
tween the two firms, such a merger creates value by avoiding the underinvestment problem
that aﬀects the distressed firm.2
2Liao (2014) shows evidence consistent with the idea that minority acquisitions (where control is not
transferred unlike the deals we study in this paper) also alleviate financial constraints in targets.
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Financial frictions can lead to underinvestment as suggested above, but also to overin-
vestment. In particular, agency problems can lead to empire building and bloated firm size
(Jensen 1986). Increasing the scale of the firm in this case creates private value for managers
or controlling shareholders (e.g., status, career concerns), but not for minority sharehold-
ers. The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between acquisitions and firm scale
suggests that acquisitions often correct overinvestment in the target firm. For instance, Li
(2013) shows that U.S. acquirers cut capital expenditures in the target and also reduce scale
along other dimensions (e.g., employment). Combined (target plus acquirer) announcement
returns of takeovers are in line with these scale reductions. Devos, Kadapakkam, and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2008) also show that synergies in mergers are mainly produced by cutbacks
in investment expenditures. This evidence is focused on the U.S. market, and therefore a
pending challenge is to extend it to other markets with poorer investor protection.
In a world with scale considerations investor protection directly aﬀects the value of firms
by relaxing financial constraints in the case of underinvestment, or by alleviating agency
problems in the case of overinvestment. For example, better investor protection increases the
equity multiplier of distressed firms and allows for higher investment (Shleifer and Wolfenzon
2002). When investor protection is perfect, there are no financial constraints or agency
problems so all firms invest at their first-best level. In such a market, acquirers cannot
add value by relaxing financial constraints, since firms are already unconstrained. Agency
problems are also under control in a market with perfect investor protection, and hence
empire building is not a motive for acquisitions. By extension of this logic to markets with
good (although not perfect) investor protection, changing the scale of the target should be
less relevant than increasing productivity as a motive for control transfers.
On the other hand, when investor protection is low, increasing the scale of distressed
targets can be a key driver of acquisitions. Also when investor protection is low, agency
problems and entrenched managers face fewer constraints. Hence, acquisitions can be moti-
vated by empire building and they can lead to overinvestment. Both of these mechanisms
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suggest a strong correlation between control transfers and increasing firm size when investor
protection is low.
These considerations lead to our second empirical prediction:
Empirical Prediction 2 (Transfers of Control and Firm Size): Transfers of control
are more correlated with changes in firm size in low investor-protection markets than in high
investor-protection markets.
Our predictions 1 and 2 distinguish the impact of investor protection on two drivers of
control transfers (productivity and scale). Better investor protection changes the relative
importance of these drivers. However, this does not have to be understood as saying that
productivity and scale are always substitutes, quite the contrary. Both productivity and
scale can move in the same direction. The point is that the relative intensity of the scale
motive wears down as investor protection improves.
There can be particular cases in which scale and productivity are substitutes. For ex-
ample, imagine a low-productivity acquirer, but with a financing capacity that more than
compensates for her low productivity. Transferring control to this low-productivity acquirer
can be eﬃcient if the new scale is large enough once financial constraints are relaxed. In
other words, total firm value (i.e., the size of the pie to be distributed among shareholders)
can be higher under this acquirer. In Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and Panunzi (2014) produc-
tivity increases in all transfers of control. In their model the scale of the firm is fixed and
therefore there is no other margin that can compensate for a productivity loss. In our setup,
productivity can fall, but the transfer can still be eﬃcient if the larger scale more than com-
pensates for the productivity loss. This potential trade-oﬀ between productivity and scale,
which is certainly not present in all transfers, has been described in previous literature on
control and financial constraints (see Tirole (2006), chapter 10)
Notice that the predictions that we study correspond to the diﬀerential eﬀect of investor
protection on control transfers. A negative eﬀect of investor protection on firm size does
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not necessarily imply that the average transfer shows a decrease in size. It is only necessary
that the average change in size is smaller in high protection countries than in low protec-
tion countries. The same is true for productivity. A positive eﬀect of investor protection
on productivity does not necessarily imply that the average transfer shows an increase in
productivity. It is only necessary that the average change in productivity is larger in high
protection countries than in low protection countries. We do not have a prediction for the
unconditional average eﬀects of control transfers on productivity and firm size, because they
depend on the relative strength of the scale and productivity motives for the average firm.
The average eﬀect also depends on whether the potential trade-oﬀ between productivity and
scale that we describe above is present in the average firm or not.
Investor protection also interacts with firm characteristics during control transfers. For
example, large acquirers are more likely to increase firm size as financial constraints are
relaxed. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that firm size is a particularly good predictor of
financial constraints. The financial advantage of large acquirers can be particularly important
in a market with low investor protection, therefore we predict a stronger scale motive in a
transfer of control between a large acquirer and a small target in a low protection market.
Similarly, the productivity motive is more likely to be behind the transfer of control between
a low-productivity target and high-productivity acquirer (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001),
and more so if this transfer occurs in a market with high investor protection. Similarly,
firm characteristics interact with investor protection in the incentives of acquirers to search
for targets. It is arguably more likely that large acquirers search for small targets in poor
protection markets since their size advantage makes them more competitive in comparison
to other acquirers in those markets.
Our third prediction summarizes these intuitions:
Empirical Prediction 3 (Triple Interactions): In high investor-protection markets
compared to low investor-protection markets, transfers of control are:
i) less correlated with changes in firm size, especially if the size diﬀerence between the
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acquirer and the target is large.
ii) more correlated with improvements in productivity, especially if the productivity dif-
ference between the acquirer and the target is large.
Our label of Prediction 3 as "triple interactions" becomes clear in the empirical section
since it refers to the regression specification that we use to test this prediction.
2 Empirical Results
2.1 Data Description
We use a combination of two datasets, Zephyr and Amadeus, from Bureau van Dijk (BvD).
Zephyr provides data on public and private deals like M&As, IPOs, acquisitions of minority
stakes, and others. It provides information on the type of deal and the characteristics of the
deal such as the stake that was acquired, legal status (listed or private firm), and industry
classification. From Zephyr we select all M&As of European firms completed between 1997
and 2012. We consider that control is transferred when the acquirer has less than 50% of
the target’s shares before the deal and more than 50% after the deal.3 We focus on private
targets, which account for the vast majority of control transfers in Zephyr. We exclude from
our sample the private-to-public deals (e.g., IPOs) or public-to-private deals (e.g., LBOs)
because the type of ownership structure and the informational environment in those cases
are changing simultaneously with the identity of the controlling shareholder. Our purpose
is to focus solely on changes of the controlling shareholder.
We then match target firms from Zephyr to Amadeus, the database that provides finan-
cial information on public and private firms in Europe. The match is necessary to have
information on financial variables before and, particularly, after the deal. We are able to
3We exclude all targets that participate in more than one deal during our sample period, with diﬀerent
acquirers or with the same acquirer. For instance, if within this period the acquirer buys 20% from the
target and then two years later increases its stake to 60%, we don’t consider this target in our sample. The
reason for excluding these observations is that it is diﬃcult to pin down the eﬀect of each individual deal in
these cases.
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observe target firms after the deal if they remain as independent legal entities and are not
fully absorbed by acquirers.4 Matching both databases is possible given that firms have a
common identifier in BvD. However, the match is not perfect because many private firms
do not appear in Amadeus.5 Also, in order to include a control transfer in our sample we
require that the target firm appears in Amadeus for at least one year before the deal, and at
least two years after the deal (e.g., for a deal in 2012 we require financial data up to 2014).
The eﬀects of control (e.g., increased fund raising) can take time to materialize, hence the
importance of having a relevant post-transfer window.6 Overall, after matching Zephyr with
Amadeus we lose approximately three-quarters of the control transfers initially identified
with basic information in Zephyr. In Table A.1 in the appendix we describe in more detail
the number of deals we lose in each step of our matching procedure.7
Following Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) we apply several restrictions to our sample.
We truncate the distribution of annual growth in total book assets at 100%.8 We use
ROA (=EBITDA/Total assets) as our main proxy of productivity, which although crude
is the best we can do given data availability.9 We truncate the distribution of ROA at
4We are able to observe the target firm basically if it continues to pay taxes. The firm can continue to exist
as an independent legal entity even if the ultimate owner changes. In some cases the target firm is absorbed
by another firm, in which case we do not observe the target firm after the transfer and it is excluded from
our data. All firms (private and public) in Europe are required to disclose their financial information to local
tax authorities and other regulators. Amadeus collects this information from local sources and standardizes
it.
5There are other problems in the match. First, Amadeus keeps a rolling window of 10 years of data for
most companies. Thus, almost all deals prior to 2005 are lost in the matching. Second, we cannot match
targets that change their BvD identifier, those that are legally absorbed by the acquirer after a control
acquisition, or those that have several BvD identifiers (BvD has been in the process of homogenizing the
codes among its databases).
6Our results are robust to focusing on a 2-year window around the acquisition. We prefer using the entire
time series available for each firm because it allows us to get better estimates of firm and year fixed eﬀects,
and therefore to see whether the transfer of control really produces a change in each firm.
7It is possible that our sample selection procedure leads to a selection bias that aﬀects the results (Netter,
Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011). Out of a universe of close to 46,000 deals with target information in Zephyr
(see Table A.1) we end up with only 10,989 deals for our main tests. We tackle the selection bias by
estimating a Heckit model. The first stage of this model is a probit (cross-sectional) equation where we
model the probability that a firm appears in our sample as a function of target assets, ROA, leverage, and
country and year dummies. We then construct the inverse of Mill’s ratio (see Wooldridge (2002)), and we
include it in our baseline regressions. Our results survive this adjustment, and Mill’s ratio is never significant,
which suggests that selection bias is not aﬀecting our results.
8Our results are robust to using lower cutoﬀs for asset growth, for example, 25% or 50%.
9EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
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−100% and 100%. We also drop observations that imply annual diﬀerences in ROA between
two consecutive years that are larger than 100 percentage points in absolute value. These
restrictions are there only to make sure that firms before and after the control transfer are
relatively comparable entities, and that our regression results are not driven by outliers. For
instance, growth rates higher than 100%, or very violent changes in ROA, can be the product
of a combination of the target with some of the parent’s other firms. Although potentially
interesting situations, these outliers are hard to identify precisely in the data and they can
heavily distort regressions and statistical inference.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 10,989 deals in our sample by country of the target
firm. Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) have a sample of close to 5,100 deals for a similar set
of countries in the years 2001-2008. Most of the deals we add to their sample correspond
to control transfers in the years 2009-2012. Our sample is much larger than what one can
gather if considering only public firms. For example, Dyck and Zingales (2004) show data
of control premia for 393 transfers in 39 countries. If we restrict the attention to European
countries in their sample we would have only 149 deals. In Zephyr we find fewer than 200
transfers of control in public firms in the same time period and countries as our main sample.
The anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) is
our main proxy for investor protection. This index captures the legal protection available to
non-controlling investors against the expropriation from corporate insiders through related-
party transactions.10 11 This index is particularly applicable to the environment of small firms
and large controlling shareholders that characterize our sample. Countries of the common
law tradition, such as the U.K. or Ireland, have the highest levels of investor protection.
10Although the focus of this index is on public firms, it covers the key issue of corporate governance that
is pervasive in public and private firms alike, namely the existence of self-dealing or tunneling. For example,
Enriques and Volpin (2007) conclude in their study of corporate reform in Europe that "far too little has been
done to resolve the problem of related-party transactions, which is the most common form of self-dealing for
dominant shareholders in Europe (p. 138, Enriques and Volpin (2007))." Moreover, as Djankov, La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) show, the laws that regulate this problem are deeply ingrained in a
country’s legal tradition (e.g., common or civil law) and, hence, they represent principles at work in the
legislation applicable to all types of corporations in the country.
11Notice that debtholders, and not only minority shareholders, are aﬀected by related party transactions
if these represent cases of risk-shifting or fraudulent conveyance.
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Scandinavian countries (e.g., Finland or Norway) are somewhat in the middle, while other
big European countries such as Germany, France, or Spain have relatively low levels of
investor protection. As can be seen in Table 1, the cross-country variation of the anti-
self-dealing index is significant in our sample given that the index, by construction, ranges
between zero and one.
The anti-self-dealing index is the preferred measure of investor protection of Djankov, La
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), who study a series of related indexes to measure
this multidimensional country characteristic. The authors argue that this is a better measure
than the anti-director index originally presented in La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998). We also use the creditor rights index, which is an index related to debtholders’
rights in bankruptcy (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007). In our sample the correlation
between the anti-self-dealing index and the creditor rights index is quite high (063), showing
that the protection of minority shareholders and the protection of debtholders tend to go
hand in hand, at least among these countries.
Table 2 shows the distribution of deals across time. The years 2006-2011 account for the
lion’s share of our sample. The financial crisis (2008-9) might make our sample period not
representative of other periods. However, the crisis might also be an advantage if it makes
financial frictions more prevalent, and the type of mechanisms suggested in this paper more
relevant.
Targets are relatively small firms, with median assets of 3.3 million EUR, although there
are some large targets as shown by the diﬀerence between average and median assets. Target
size is comparable to the one in Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015). Target age is on average
22 years, which shows that these are mostly well-established firms and not start-ups or new
entrepreneurial ventures. The average stake after acquisitions is 95.3%, hence this is an
environment of large controlling shareholders and not dispersed ownership structures. This
also shows that control is typically not shared, for instance, among two large shareholders.
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2.2 Preliminary evidence
Table 3 shows changes around control transfers for the main variables in our analysis. For
each firm we compute the average of a variable before and then after the transfer of control.
We compute the diﬀerence between these averages (after minus before) for each firm, and
then we average these diﬀerences across firms. The average change in ROA is −0036 while
the average change in (log) total assets is 0066. Table 3 shows raw averages, without
adjusting, for example, for time fixed eﬀects. The recessions in the latter part of our sample
(2008-9, 2011-12) can explain in part the average fall in ROA after transfers.12 However,
an aggregate macro eﬀect does not necessarily explain the diﬀerence between high and low
protection countries, which is the focus of our empirical prediction. We consider the investor
protection of the country of the target firm as our measure of investor protection. The
average fall in ROA in high investor protection countries is less pronounced than in low
protection countries (−0022 vs. −0039), which implies a positive diﬀerence of 0017 in
favor of high protection countries. At the same time, assets decrease in high protection
countries while they increase in low protection countries (−0544 vs. 0255), which implies
a negative diﬀerence of −0799 against high protection countries. Diﬀerences between high
and low investor protection are significant at the 1% level.
Other variables reported in Table 3 include the main components of EBITDA, which is
equal to sales, minus the costs of goods sold, and minus other operating expenses. This helps
us to better understand the behavior of ROA. Despite a relative fall in sales when comparing
high and low protection countries (0002 vs. 0148), high protection countries are better than
low protection countries at controlling costs (0077 vs. 0421) and cutting other operating
expenses (−0088 vs. 0570). We also report the main components of EBITDA as a fraction
of sales, where we find that the main decrease in costs in high protection countries compared
to low protection countries comes from other operating expenses (−0017 vs. 0178).
12One could argue that the decision to transfer control is based on expected productivity, but that ex-post
productivity includes unpredictable macro shocks such as the crisis of 2008. In the data we get to see only
ex-post or realized ROA.
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In a similar way as with the profitability decomposition we split total assets into fixed
assets and current assets. Fixed assets include tangible assets and intangible assets (e.g.,
patents or software), plus depreciation. We find a negative and significant diﬀerence between
high and low protection countries in both fixed and current assets. When looking at ratios
of fixed and current assets over total assets we find that the negative diﬀerence between high
and low protection countries is focused on fixed assets. Finally, leverage (=book debt over
book assets) also decreases more strongly in high protection countries.13
In Table 4 we split the raw data by type of deal, depending on whether ROA increased
or decreased after the transfer of control, and similarly for total assets.14 We find that
deals with an increase in ROA are relatively more frequent in high protection countries than
in low protection countries (42% vs. 38%), while the opposite is true for deals with an
increase in assets (42% vs. 61%). The higher frequency of productivity-increasing deals in
high protection countries explains in part the positive eﬀect of investor protection on ROA
that we see in Table 3. While the lower frequency of size-increasing deals explains in part
the negative eﬀect of investor protection on firm size.
Table 4 also shows that our findings do not solely rely on the relative frequency of diﬀerent
types of deals. We find that within deal-type the diﬀerence in ROA changes between countries
with high and low protection is generally positive (see the next-to-last column in Table 4).
The exception corresponds to deals with a decrease in ROA, although the diﬀerence (only
−0005) is smaller in magnitude than the positive diﬀerences seen in other deals. Againwithin
deal-type, the diﬀerence in asset changes between countries with high and low protection is
always negative (see the last column of Table 4). This implies that, even holding constant
the relative frequency of deals, transfers of control in high protection countries tend to be
empirically associated with a relative increase in ROA and a relative decrease in assets
compared to deals in low protection countries.
13The overall drop in target leverage during this period can be attributed to the financial crisis, although
not necessarily the intensity of the drop according to investor protection.
14There are fewer deals in Table 4 than in Table 1 because we do not have data simultaneously for ROA
and assets in every deal.
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2.3 Main results on the consequences of control transfers
We test our predictions with the following panel regression:
Firm Outcome = Control + (Control × Investor Protection) +  +  +  (1)
Firm outcome can be ROA or log-assets of firm  in year . Control is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one on the year of the control transfer and subsequent years for each
firm, and zero otherwise. Since financial data is recorded at the end of the year, data for the
same year of the deal already contains eﬀects related to the change of controlling shareholder.
The interaction of Control with the level of investor protection in country  where firm 
is domiciled (Investor Protection) captures variation in the eﬀect of control transfers as a
function of investor protection. The regression above is basically a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
setup in the sense that we first compute before-and-after diﬀerences for each firm, and we
then study how these diﬀerences vary according to investor protection.
Our sample selection and regression specification follows closely Erel, Jang, and Weisbach
(2015), except for the new interaction term. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects ()
that capture any aggregate time-varying eﬀects such as the crisis of 2008. Perhaps more
important is the inclusion of firm fixed eﬀects (), which has several advantages. First,
firm fixed eﬀects imply that we are focusing on the time series variation within each firm as
control is transferred, or that each firm is compared to its own history. Any time-invariant
firm characteristic is absorbed by the fixed eﬀect. Second, and as a corollary of the previous
point, the firm fixed eﬀects absorb any time-invariant industry or country eﬀects. For this
reason we do not add investor protection as an independent variable to regressions. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level in all of our regressions since investor protection is
a country variable.15
Table 5 shows results for the main panel regressions. The average control transfer im-
15Our results are robust to using firm-clustered standard errors.
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plies a fall in ROA ( = −0013, -stat= −260) and an increase in log-assets ( = 0101,
-stat= 561). These results are already conditional on time fixed eﬀects, so we cannot
blame aggregate macro eﬀects for the average fall in profitability. The average fall in ROA
after transfers of control has not been documented before, but it is reminiscent of the well-
established post-IPO drop in profitability (see Pástor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009) and ref-
erences herein).16 At least according to our setup the prediction for the average eﬀect is
ambiguous, since it depends on the relative strength of the scale motive and the productiv-
ity motive for the average firm. The results in Table 5 suggest that in our sample financial
constraints are strong since the average firm is gaining scale and giving up profitability at
the same time.17
Our main interest is on how investor protection modifies the average eﬀect of transferring
control. This eﬀect is captured by the interaction of the control dummy with investor pro-
tection ( coeﬃcient). Although the coeﬃcient on the control dummy in the ROA regression
is negative, the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction ( = 0038, -stat= 271) implies that
the productivity eﬀect of control transfers becomes positive (or less negative) as investor
protection increases. The interaction is negative in the case of log assets ( = −0744,
-stat= −506), which means that the average increase in assets after control transfers is
smaller or even negative as investor protection increases.
In order to illustrate the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients in Table 5 we consider the following
thought experiment. We compare the results of a control transfer in a market at the 25th
percentile of investor protection in our sample (Czech Republic) with a control transfer in
a market at the 75th percentile of investor protection (Finland). Focusing on the second
column for each dependent variable in Table 5, we find that the average control transfer
in the Czech Republic would show a fall in ROA of 0017, and an increase in (log) assets
16Transfers of control and IPOs are diﬀerent corporate events, but analogous explanations can be drawn
in each case. The IPO literature has explored rational and behavioral theories for the average negative eﬀect
on profitability, ranging from real options to adverse selection and market timing. We do not take a stand
regarding these theories when applied to control transfers.
17Identifying the average eﬀect of control on productivity and scale is an important, yet unresolved issue
in the literature (see, for example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Pérez-González (2007)).
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of 0218. A control transfer in Finland would show a 50 basis-point gain in productivity
(through a smaller fall in ROA of 0012) vis-à-vis the same transfer in the Czech Republic,
but an almost 10% smaller change in scale (through an increase in log assets of 0121)
2.4 Is it really investor protection?
One concern with our results is whether they are derived from investor protection itself or
from other country characteristics that are correlated with investor protection. We tackle
this omitted variables problem by making a horse race between our main interaction with
investor protection and interactions with other country characteristics.
For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) study the impact of per capita GDP and ac-
counting quality in the context of finance and growth. The interaction with per capita GDP
is interesting because a naive view of investor protection is that it is just a proxy for income
levels. However, the results in columns 1 and 5 of Table 6 show that the interaction of control
and per capita GDP does not drive away our main interaction.
Accounting practices can explain diﬀerences in the informational environment between
countries. We proxy for accounting practices in two ways. First, similarly to Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), we use the index of accounting quality taken from the Global Competitiveness
Index (1-7 index; 7 is best). Second, we use a dummy for the period after the adoption of
IFRS in each country. IFRS was adopted in 2005 in most western European countries, but
later than 2005 in Russia, Romania, and other eastern European countries in our sample.
If the ROA results are related to informational asymmetries we can expect the interaction
of the control dummy and accounting practices to have a positive coeﬃcient in the regres-
sion (i.e., lower fall in ROA when information is relatively good). We do not find evidence
for this hypothesis in Table 6 (see columns 2 and 3). Even after controlling for accounting
practices the interaction of control and investor protection remains significant, and of similar
magnitude when compared to baseline results.
We also incorporate several controls from the World Bank database of governance indi-
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cators, in particular, measures of the rule of law, government eﬀectiveness, and regulatory
quality. As seen in columns 4 and 8 of Table 6, the interactions of these variables with the
control dummy are never statistically significant, nor do they drive away our main interaction
with investor protection.
A related concern that we study in Table 7 is the robustness of our results to alterna-
tive measures of investor protection. The anti-self dealing index can be a noisy proxy for
investor protection, although this measurement error would only bias the results against our
predictions. One of the disadvantages of the anti-self dealing index is that it does not have
time-series variation. As an alternative we explore the enactment of the European Takeover
Directive, which provides a time-varying measure of investor protection within the European
Union. Diﬀerent countries incorporated the board neutrality rule to diﬀerent extents, and
starting from diﬀerent levels of compliance before the directive. Davies, Schuster, and van
de Walle de Ghelcke (2010) provide details on the implementation of this rule (see their
Table 3). As seen in column 1 of Table 7, the interaction of the enactment of the board
neutrality rule with the control dummy has a positive sign, which implies that ROA goes up
after control transfers particularly so in countries that implemented the rule more strictly.
The coeﬃcient is, however, not statistically significant. One potential explanation for this
result is that, although the change in regulation is well identified in this case, it only refers
to one particular aspect of investor protection.
The creditor rights index is based on the rights of debtholders in the event of bankruptcy
(Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007). The results with creditor rights in the regression
for ROA (column 2 of Table 7) are comparable to the anti-self dealing index in sign and
significance. The coeﬃcient in the regression for assets is still negative, although significance
is reduced (column 6 of Table 7).
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that the protection of non-
controlling investors is ultimately a function of the legal origin of the country, which provides
the principles that define commercial law. Countries with a common law tradition (U.K.,
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U.S.A., former British colonies in Africa and Asia) fare better in almost all dimensions of
investor protection. On average, Scandinavian and German countries are somewhat below
common law countries in terms of investor protection, and civil law countries (i.e., French
legal origin) are at the bottom. In Table 7 we interact our control variable with dummies
for the diﬀerent legal origins (civil law is the excluded category). We find that common law
countries have the strongest positive impact on ROA, and the largest reduction in assets.
Scandinavian countries have smaller reductions in assets than common law countries, but
stronger than German countries. We do not find a meaningful diﬀerence between German
countries and civil law countries. Finally, following La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998), we instrument for the interaction of control
and investor protection with the previous interactions of control and legal origin dummies
(see the last column for ROA and for assets in Table 7). The results using 2SLS confirm the
previous OLS results.
2.5 Decomposing the eﬀects on productivity and scale
In order to better understand the relative increase in productivity allowed by investor pro-
tection we run separate regressions with the main elements of EBITDA.18 As can be seen
in the first column of Table 8, there is no diﬀerential eﬀect of investor protection on sales
after control is transferred. However, in columns 2 and 3 there is a significant reduction in
the costs of goods sold and other operating expenses when investor protection is high (see
Li (2013) for similar evidence among U.S. takeover targets). This suggests that productivity
increases are achieved through cost-cutting while retaining similar sales, instead of increasing
sales aggressively.
In Table 8 we also dig deeper into the scale results. The diﬀerential eﬀect of investor
protection is highly significant for both fixed assets and current assets (see columns 4 and
5). The eﬀect is larger in magnitude in the case of fixed assets (−0835 vs. −0407). This
18The number of observations varies for the diﬀerent elements of EBITDA. Often times the decomposition
is incomplete although the final value of EBITDA is available in the dataset.
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suggests that transfers of control have more to do with the divestiture of tangible assets
(i.e., property, machines, etc.) than with an eﬃcient use of working capital. Our results are
in line with Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Li (2013) who find that
acquisitions in the U.S. are related to cutting investment expenditures.
The last column in Table 8 shows the regression with leverage as dependent variable,
which reflects the capital structure of the firm. We find that the control dummy has a
positive coeﬃcient (coeﬀ. 0066, -stat 253), although the interaction of control and investor
protection has a negative impact on leverage (coeﬀ. −0171, -stat −57). In other words,
although leverage increases after transfers of control, which is a sign of relaxing financial
constraints, the increase is less pronounced (or leverage goes down) in countries with good
investor protection. This is consistent with the idea that, in high protection markets, financial
constraints are less binding even before control transfers.
2.6 Acquirer and target characteristics
Acquirer and target characteristics relative are important for the outcomes of control trans-
fers (Erel, Jang, and Weisbach 2015). Large acquirers are more likely to increase target size
as financial constraints are relaxed. Highly profitable acquirers are more likely to increase
target profitability (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001). Investor protection probably aﬀects the
selection process involved in acquisitions. For example, large acquirers are more likely to
target small firms in an environment of poor investor protection since their relative size is a
stronger advantage in those markets in comparison to markets with good investor protection.
In Table 9 we show regressions where we interact the control dummy with the relative
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size (and also profitability) of acquirers and targets:
Firm Outcome = Control + (Control × Investor Protection)
+(Control ×Relative Size)
+(Control ×Relative Size × Investor Protection)
+ +  +  (2)
Relative size is the diﬀerence in (log) assets between the acquirer and the target. Relative
profitability (not shown above) is the diﬀerence in ROA between the acquirer and the target.
Both diﬀerences are measured in the year before the acquisition with data from Zephyr.
As expected, the interaction with relative profitability has a positive and significant
coeﬃcient in the ROA regressions (columns 1-3 Table 9), and the interaction with relative
size has a positive and significant coeﬃcient in the assets regressions (columns 4-6 Table 9).
It is harder to predict a sign for the cross-eﬀects, for example, the eﬀect of relative size on
ROA.
We also include triple interactions of the control dummy, acquirer-target characteristics,
and investor protection.19 We find significant triple interactions in the regression for assets
(column 6 Table 9). As in our Prediction 3, the triple interaction of control, relative size,
and investor protection is negative (coeﬀ. −0113, -stat. −256), which suggests that large
acquirers do not have such a big impact on scale in high protection markets because target
firms are initially less constrained. We do not find evidence in favor of the second part
of Prediction 3 since the triple interaction of control, relative profitability, and investor
protection is not significant in the ROA regression (column 3 Table 9).
After controlling for acquirer-target characteristics the significance of our main double
interaction of control and investor protection survives in the regressions for assets (columns
5-6 in Table 9). The coeﬃcients on this interaction are comparable in magnitude to the
19Other double interactions are absorbed by firm fixed eﬀects given that acquirer-target relative charac-
teristics are constant for each firm.
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main regressions in Table 5. In the ROA regressions, however, the double interaction is
no longer significant at conventional levels (columns 2-3 in Table 9). The coeﬃcients are
of similar magnitude compared to the baseline results, but the standard errors increase
by a factor of two. Part of this can be attributed to a potential case of over-controlling
when we include acquirer-target characteristics. By controlling for acquirer-target relative
characteristics we give up an important margin of influence of investor protection, namely
that investor protection modifies the set of transfers that occur in equilibrium (the "extensive
margin"). As investor protection improves, relatively fewer transfers are made towards larger
acquirers simply to gain scale, and relatively more transfers are made towards more profitable
acquirers. In other words, by controlling for acquirer-target characteristics we are focusing
on the eﬀect of investor protection only within a given pair of firms (the "intensive margin")
that is matched for supposedly exogenous reasons.
Implicit in our analysis so far is that the relevant variation in investor protection is cross-
country. We do this for two reasons. First, for identification purposes: there is more hope
that this component is exogenous to the firm-level decision to transfer control, at least when
compared to firm variables associated with corporate governance. Second, the available
empirical evidence suggests that the country component dominates diﬀerences in corporate
governance (see Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)). Our approach does not rule out the
existence of a firm-level component in investor protection. However, it does rest on the idea
that local investor protection cannot be perfectly substituted for other firm characteristics,
such as the origin of the acquirer. Previous research shows that acquirers from good investor
protection countries may help targets in poor protection countries to "import" investor
protection (see Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris and Cabolis (2008)).
One way to test the substitution hypothesis is to include in our regression the interaction
with the investor protection of the acquirer’s country. As seen in Table 10, the interaction
with the investor protection of the acquirer’s country has a negative sign in the ROA re-
gression unlike our main interaction with the investor protection of the target’s country. In
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the assets regression the interaction with the investor protection of the acquirer’s country is
not statistically significant. The significance of our main interaction survives the inclusion
of the interaction with the acquirer’s investor protection in both the ROA and the assets
regressions.
Another alternative is to include the diﬀerence in investor protection between the country
of the target and the acquirer. As seen in Table 10, we find a positive coeﬃcient in the ROA
regression for this interaction which means that the eﬀect of the target’s country dominates.
The interaction with the diﬀerence in investor protection is not significant in the assets
regression, while the interaction with the target’s investor protection is still significant (see
last column in Table 10). Overall, the results in Table 10 are consistent with the idea that the
local legal environment cannot be perfectly substituted with other governance mechanisms.
In other words, local investor protection matters even if foreign acquirers can ameliorate
some of the deficiencies of the local market by "importing" investor protection.
Acquisitions across industries are more likely to be motivated bymanagerial entrenchment
and empire building (Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy 2008). Almeida, Campello,
and Hackbarth (2011) argue that mergers due to financial distress ("liquidity mergers") are
more likely within industries. Therefore, it is interesting to see if investor protection has a
diﬀerential eﬀect in deals where the target and the acquirer operate in diﬀerent industries
or in the same industry. We label acquisitions as "diversifying" when the acquirer and the
target are in diﬀerent industries.20 In Table 11 we find that the eﬀect of investor protec-
tion can be seen both in diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions. We test formally if
there is a statistically significant diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients across samples by including
an interaction with a dummy for diversifying acquisitions in the regression that includes
all deals (columns 3 and 6 of Table 11). The interaction with diversifying acquisitions is
never significant. One interpretation of these results is that investor protection is equally
eﬀective in reining in empire-building acquisitions across industries, while reducing the need
20We define an acquisition as "diversifying" when the target and the acquirer operate in two diﬀerent
SIC-2 codes.
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for liquidity mergers within industries. Our result that ROA improvements are not limited
to non-diversifying acquisitions is consistent with the finding of Schoar (2002) about the
productivity improvements of targets in diversifying acquisitions.
In our sample we have cases of a single acquirer buying several targets. The presence of
a single acquirer in multiple deals allows us to control for time-invariant acquirer character-
istics through acquirer fixed eﬀects, on top of the already included target-firm fixed eﬀects.
Therefore, any variation that we find in outcomes must to be due to changes in the target
through time and cannot be attributed to the acquirer itself. This focus on "serial acquirers"
(i.e., acquirers for which we observe more than one acquisition) follows the empirical strategy
of Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). Close to a third of the observations in our sample
correspond to acquisitions by serial acquirers. In Table 12 we run regressions separately for
serial and non-serial acquirers and we find that the eﬀects, although statistically significant
in each sub-sample, are stronger in magnitude among serial acquirers. This reinforces the
idea that the our results are related to changes in the target as it falls under a new controlling
shareholder, and not simply a function of acquirer characteristics.
Finally, in Table 13 we explore potential variation in our results across diﬀerent ownership
structures of targets and acquirers. The ownership data has to be put together from annual
Amadeus’ DVDs, since it is not readily available for download from WRDS. The ownership
data includes the names of controlling shareholders and their ownership stakes, together with
the listing status of the company. First, we split acquirers into publicly listed and non-listed.
(All targets are private companies.) Then, we split acquirers and targets into those with and
without a strong controlling shareholder before the deal. For the case of private companies
this implies that there is a shareholder who owns at least 50% of the shares, while this
threshold is 20% for public companies. Although with varying magnitude of the coeﬃcients,
the results are almost uniformly robust across sub-samples. All of the coeﬃcients have the
predicted signs, and all except for one are statistically significant. This suggests that the
type of ownership structure before the deal is not crucial for our main findings.
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2.7 Assorted robustness checks
In Table 14 we show our results after controlling for alternative sets of fixed eﬀects. Industry-
year fixed eﬀects can capture merger waves or particular technological changes at the industry
level. If industrial composition is correlated with investor protection, then our interaction
of interest can be related to these eﬀects instead of the mechanism we propose. As seen in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 14, our results remain robust after we include industry-year fixed
eﬀects.
Next we include country-year fixed eﬀects on top of the baseline firm fixed eﬀects (see
columns 3 and 4 in Table 14). The coeﬃcient on the interaction in the ROA regression is
smaller than our baseline estimate (0028 vs. 0038), but it is still significant at the 10%
level. The interaction in the assets regressions is still negative, but it is no longer significant.
Country-year fixed eﬀects are tough controls, since they absorb potentially a big chunk of
the variation that we actually want to explain. These fixed eﬀects absorb cross-sectional
diﬀerences in investor protection, like country dummies, but also the interaction of these
country eﬀects with time. Our control dummy is basically a "before-and-after" variable for
each firm. Since, by construction, early years in our sample are more likely to be "before"
years and later years are more likely to be "after" years, the country-year dummies capture a
relevant piece of the variation that allows us to identify the interaction of investor protection
and control. Despite the strictness of these fixed eﬀects, the overall message survives, and
in particular the ROA result that is the key prediction of Burkart, Gromb, Mueller, and
Panunzi (2014). It is still a word of caution when interpreting our results since we cannot
claim that we can perfectly separate our results from unobserved country-year eﬀects. This
is specially true in a relatively short sample like the one we have (mainly 2006-2011).
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3 Conclusions
In this paper we study the consequences of investor protection for control transfers in corpo-
rations. We argue that investor protection changes the relative importance of productivity
and scale as two drivers of control transfers. When investor protection is strong the main
driver of acquisitions is the possibility to transfer control to a more productive acquirer.
Since financial constraints are relaxed for all firms when investor protection is high, the
possibility to transfer control to an acquirer with a financial advantage simply to gain scale
is less relevant. Also, good investor protection limits the possibility of empire-building type
of acquisitions and hence increasing scale through overinvestment. Consistent with these
predictions we find that, when investor protection is high, control transfers are decreasingly
correlated with changes in scale, and increasingly correlated with profitability improvements.
The results come from a large sample of private European firms that experienced transfers
of control mainly between 2006 and 2011.
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Country-level Characteristics  
The table shows the number of control transfers for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 
2012. The table also shows country characteristics such as the anti-self-dealing index that measures investor 
protection, creditor rights and GDP per capita (log). 
 
   
Country Number of Deals
Investor Protection 
(Anti-Self Dealing) Creditor Rights
GDP per 
Capita (log)
Austria 156 0.21 3 10.08
Belgium 384 0.54 2 10.01
Bulgaria 72 0.65 2 7.36
Croatia 42 0.25 3 8.34
Czech Republic 182 0.33 3 8.52
Denmark 87 0.46 3 10.3
Finland 541 0.46 1 10.05
France 977 0.38 0 10.01
Germany 703 0.28 3 10.03
Greece 28 0.22 1 9.24
Hungary 102 0.18 1 8.45
Iceland 9 0.26                10.3
Ireland 89 0.79 1 10.12
Italy 509 0.42 2 9.83
Latvia 64 0.32 3 8.01
Lithuania 48 0.36 2 8.09
Luxemburg 19 0.28                10.71
Netherlands 653 0.2 3 10.06
Norway 555 0.42 2 10.52
Poland 323 0.29 1 8.37
Portugal 133 0.44 1 9.25
Romania 128 0.44 2 7.41
Russia 1,186 0.44 2 7.49
Slovakia 37 0.29                8.23
Spain 696 0.37 2 9.54
Sweden 731 0.33 1 10.2
Turkey 1 0.43 2 7.99
Ukraine 210 0.08 2 6.45
United Kingdom 2,324 0.95 4 10.1
Total 10,989 0.49 2.24 9.52
Table 2 
Target and Deal Characteristics by Year 
The table shows the annual frequency of control transfers for a sample of European private targets between 
1997 and 2012. The table also shows the mean (median) of targets’ assets in thousands of Euros, the mean 
of targets’ age in years, as well as the initial stake (pre-acquisition) and the final stake (post-acquisition) the 

















Mean Median Mean Mean Mean
1997-2004 234            45,797       3,883            28.5 2.9 94.0
2005 927            48,280       4,494            26.4 3.5 94.8
2006 1,421         45,261       3,667            24.5 2.4 95.8
2007 1,859         30,590       3,791            24.0 2.7 95.4
2008 1,703         26,499       3,556            22.6 2.1 95.6
2009 1,373         39,778       2,959            22.1 3.0 93.9
2010 1,713         35,927       3,106            21.0 2.7 94.6
2011 1,577         41,033       2,897            19.5 2.3 96.2
2012 182            21,644       1,074            16.3 1.4 98.2
Total 10,989       36,992       3,386            22.7 2.6 95.3
Target's Assets before 
Acquisition (EUR '000)
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Transfers of Control 
The table shows summary statistics for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. For 
each target we compute the average of each characteristic (ROA, assets, etc.) after and before the deal, and 
then take the difference between these two averages (after minus before). The Table shows the mean and the 
standard deviation of this difference for all observations, and then for subsamples in countries with high and 
low investor protection. High and low investor protection are defined according to the average investor 
protection in Table 1. Firm characteristics include return over assets (ROA) defined as EBITDA over assets; 
the log of total assets (Assets); sales (both in log and as a fraction of assets); cost of goods sold and other 
operating expenses (both in log and as a fraction of sales); fixed and current assets (both in log and as a 




After-minus-Before Changes Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ROA -0.036 0.188 -0.022 0.207 -0.039 0.183 0.017 0.01
Assets (log) 0.066 1.979 -0.544 2.418 0.255 1.749 -0.799 0.00
Sales (log) 0.128 1.503 0.002 1.192 0.148 1.552 -0.145 0.00
Sales over Total Assets -0.161 1.165 0.011 1.419 -0.197 1.104 0.208 0.00
Cost of Goods Sold (log) 0.306 1.514 0.077 1.289 0.421 1.609 -0.344 0.00
Cost of Goods Sold over Sales -0.018 0.161 0.000 0.145 -0.028 0.169 0.027 0.00
Other Operating Expenses (log) 0.293 1.563 -0.088 1.481 0.570 1.574 -0.658 0.00
Other Operating Expenses over Sales 0.003 0.193 -0.017 0.213 0.017 0.178 -0.034 0.00
Fixed Assets (log) -0.107 2.012 -0.676 1.841 0.110 2.036 -0.786 0.00
Fixed Assets over Total Assets -0.009 0.200 -0.033 0.197 -0.001 0.201 -0.031 0.00
Current Assets (log) 0.268 1.566 0.003 2.172 0.355 1.276 -0.352 0.00
Current Assets over Total Assets 0.019 0.210 0.064 0.218 0.004 0.205 0.060 0.00








Types of Deals in High and Low Investor Protection Countries 
The table shows the number of deals, their frequency and characteristics for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. The table splits deals in 
high and low investor protection countries (of targets), and also according to deal outcomes: deals with increases or decreases in ROA or assets relative to before 




























Increase in ROA 469 0.42 0.134 -0.705 2238 0.38 0.112 0.238 0.022 -0.94
Decrease in ROA 636 0.58 -0.137 -0.76 3591 0.62 -0.132 0.24 -0.005 -1.00
By Assets:
Increase in Assets 464 0.42 -0.015 0.73 3527 0.61 -0.035 0.99 0.020 -0.25
Decrease in Assets 641 0.58 -0.027 -1.80 2302 0.39 -0.044 -0.91 0.017 -0.89
High Investor Protection Low Investor Protection High-Low Investor 
Table 5 
Investor Protection and the Consequences of Control Transfers: Panel Regressions 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), 
and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this 
dummy and investor protection in the target’s country proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008). All regressions include firm 
and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control -0.013*** -0.030*** 0.101*** 0.464***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.018) (0.127)
0.038*** -0.744***
(0.014) (0.147)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67,260 66,174 100,228 98,959
R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.018
Assets (log)ROA
Control x Investor Protection
Table 6 
Other Country Characteristics and the Consequences of Control Transfers 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
assets (log). Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this dummy and the following 
variables: investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008), GDP per capita (log), a proxy for accounting quality, a 
dummy for the  period after the adoption of IFRS in each country, and proxies for government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law from the World 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control -0.036 -0.021 -0.024** -0.027*** 3.202*** 2.299*** 0.890* 0.621***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.011) (0.005) (1.101) (0.590) (0.442) (0.177)
0.037** 0.040** 0.038** 0.038** -0.391** -0.441*** -0.730*** -0.614***













Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,174 66,174 66,174 65,003 98,959 98,959 98,959 97,344
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.021 0.025
Control x Rule of Law
Assets (log)ROA
Control x Regulatory Quality
Control x IFRS Adoption
Control x Government Effectiveness
Control x Investor Protection
Control x Accounting Quality
Control x GDP per Capita (log)
Table 7 
Other Financial Characteristics and the Consequences of Control Transfers 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
assets (log). Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this dummy and the following 
variables: an index for Board Neutrality Rule from Davies, Schuster and van de Walle de Ghelcke (2010) following Europe’s Takeover Directive in 2004, a proxy 
for creditor rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and a set of dummy variables that take the value of one for countries with Common law, 
Scandinavian, and German legal origin respectively (French legal origin is the excluded category). The instrumented version of investor protection corresponds to 
a 2SLS regression where the previous dummy variables for legal origin are instruments for the anti-self-dealing index. All regressions include firm and year fixed 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.037*** -0.265 0.310* 0.283* 0.473***













Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58,810 65,959 66,174 66,136 90,242 98,630 98,959 99,575
R-squared 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.018
Assets (log)
Control x Common Law Dummy
Control x Scandinavian Law Dummy
Control x German Law Dummy
Control x Instrumented Investor Protection
Control x Board Neutrality Rule
Control x Creditor Rights
ROA
Table 8 
Decomposing the Effects of Control Transfers on Productivity, Scale, and Capital Structure 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are sales, cost of goods sold, 
other operating expenses, fixed assets, current assets (all in log), and leverage as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one 
after the transfer of control and the interaction between this dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. 
(2008). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, 
*** 1%. 
 
   
Capital Structure








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control 0.059 0.247*** 0.606** 0.394*** 0.308** 0.066**
(0.070) (0.060) (0.216) (0.103) (0.117) (0.026)
-0.106 -0.330*** -0.825*** -0.835*** -0.407** -0.171***
(0.121) (0.086) (0.246) (0.244) (0.150) (0.030)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75,252 22,541 24,724 64,120 98,487 86,642
R-squared 0.009 0.035 0.041 0.022 0.025 0.043
Control x Investor Protection
Decomposing EBITDA Decomposing Assets
Table 9 
Regressions with Acquirer-Target Relative Size and Profitability 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one for control acquisitions after the deal, the interaction between 
this dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008); the acquirer-target relative size (profitability), 
which we measure as the difference between the acquirer’s assets (ROA) and the target’s assets (ROA) before the transfer of control. All regressions include firm 
and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control -0.005 -0.022* -0.020 -0.091** 0.360** 0.222
(0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.165) (0.183)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.132***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
0.180*** 0.180*** 0.207*** -0.228** -0.225** -0.494**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.105) (0.108) (0.221)
0.041 0.035 -1.050*** -0.733*





Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,155 47,155 47,155 57,699 57,699 57,699
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.027 0.032 0.032
Assets (log)
Control x Relative Profitability x Investor Protection
Control x Relative Size
Control x Relative Profitability
Control x Investor Protection
Control x Relative Size x Investor Protection
ROA
Table 10 
Investor Protection in the Acquirer’s Country 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this 
dummy and investor protection in the target’s country proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008), the investor protection from the 
acquirer’s country and the difference between the target’s and the acquirer’s investor protection. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. 
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control -0.022** -0.013** -0.022** 0.479*** 0.096*** 0.479***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.170) (0.024) (0.170)
0.048*** 0.021 -0.794** -0.790***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.338) (0.203)
-0.027** 0.004
(0.012) (0.393)
0.035*** 0.027** -0.375 -0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.295) (0.393)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 59,946 59,946 59,946 89,143 89,143 89,143
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.019
ROA Assets (log)
Control x Acquirer's Investor Protection
Control x Difference in Investor Protection
Control x Target's Investor Protection
Table 11 
Diversifying Deals 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. In the Table we split the sample based on whether 
the deals are diversifying or not, which we define as those where the target and the acquirer are from different 2-digit SIC codes. Dependent variables are return 
on assets (ROA) and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction 
between this dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008), as well as a dummy for diversifying 




Diversifying Non-Diversifying All Diversifying
Non-
Diversifying All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.028*** 0.471*** 0.434*** 0.388***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.139) (0.116) (0.124)
0.039*** 0.036* 0.036* -0.657*** -0.784*** -0.788***





Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,553 30,621 66,174 51,184 47,775 98,959
R-squared 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019
ROA Assets (log)
Control x Investor Protection
Control x Diversifying Acquisitions
Control x Investor Protection x Diversifying Acquisitions
Type of Deal Type of Deal
Table 12  
Serial Acquirers 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. The Table splits the sample between deals with 
serial acquirers, which we defined as those acquirers that make more than one acquisition during our sample period. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this 
dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects 
(not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
  
No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control -0.028*** -0.040** 0.428*** 0.563***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.104) (0.187)
0.027** 0.071** -0.653*** -1.006***
(0.010) (0.027) (0.123) (0.230)
Target Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45,566 20,608 69,835 29,124
R-squared 0.017 0.026 0.016 0.026
Control x Investor Protection
Serial Acquirers Serial Acquirers
Assets (log)ROA
Table 13 
Ownership Structure of Acquirers and Targets 
The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. The Table splits the sample based on acquirers 
listed status and also on whether acquirers and targets have controlling shareholders, which we define as having a shareholder with more than 50% (20%) of the 
shares in private (listed) firms. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes 
the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by 
Djankov et al. (2008). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. Significance: 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Control -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.020** -0.030*** -0.016* -0.036*** 0.582*** 0.424*** 0.322*** 0.496*** 0.498*** 0.454***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.119) (0.128) (0.091) (0.112) (0.114) (0.082)
0.083*** 0.026** 0.024*** 0.039** 0.016 0.041*** -0.831*** -0.714*** -0.517*** -0.693** -0.855*** -0.615***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.209) (0.161) (0.158) (0.241) (0.174) (0.144)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,261 56,913 19,905 12,905 15,013 10,073 13,800 85,159 33,401 22,215 24,138 16,362
R-squared 0.013 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.025 0.018 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.051
ROA Assets (log)
Listed Acquirer Target w/Controlling Shareholder
Acquirer w/Controlling 
Shareholder
Control x Investor 
Protection





The table shows fixed effect panel regressions for a sample of European private targets between 1997 and 2012. Dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) 
and assets (log) as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of one after the transfer of control and the interaction between this 
dummy and investor protection proxied with the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008). The Table shows regressions with industry-year 
(Columns 1-2) and country-year dummies (Columns 3-4). All regressions include firm fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 




ROA Assets (log) ROA Assets (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control -0.032*** 0.344*** -0.026*** 0.109***
(0.007) (0.097) (0.008) (0.031)
0.041*** -0.492*** 0.028* -0.018
(0.014) (0.154) (0.015) (0.043)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,046 95,191 66,174 98,959
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.250
Industry-Year Dummies Country-Year Dummies
Control x Investor Protection
Table A.1 






Total number of deals 145,834          
Deals where both the target and acquirer have Bureau van Dijk identifiers 106,481          
Deals where we know the stake acquired and the final stake 81,900            
Deals with targets' accounting data 46,239            
Deals with both target and acquirers' accounting data 33,060            
Matching with Amadeus
Number of deals matched 21,904            
Deals for which we have accounting data both before and after the deal 10,989            
